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CooPER v. CooPER

[S. F. No. 19475.

In Bank.

[49 C.2d

Aug. 13, 1957.]

HAROLD EDWARD COOPER, JR., a Minor, etc., et al.,
Respondents, v. IDA COOPER, Individually and as Executrix, etc., Appellant.
[1] Insurance-Proceeds-Persons Entitled-Effect of Divorce Decree.-In an action to establish that children were entitled
to the proceeds of insurance policies assigned by their father to
their mother in a property settlement agreement providing that
the husband would execute appropriate instruments, as required, to provide that the wife and a designated bank would
act as joint trustees to administer the proceeds for the support of the wife and minor children, the court's determination
that the agreement had not been abandoned or superseded by
a divorce decree obtained by the wife was not supported
where the evidence showed that she made no attempt to discover whether a trust instrument had been executed by the
husband, where he made the payments for child support
ordered by the decree rather than those agreed on in the
settlement (which was not incorporated in the decree), where
she accepted those payments, where he remarried and immediately surrendered some policies and changed the beneficiary of the other policy, which was a clear indication
that he considered the agreement no longer binding on him,
and where in the interlocutory decree prepared by the wife's
attorney it was declared that the agreement had been "fully
consummated"; under such circumstances the divorced wife
and the children did not have a vested interest in the policies.
[2] !d.-Actions-Limitations and Laches.-In an action to establish that children were entitled to the proceeds of certain
insurance policies assigned by father to mother in a property settlement agreement providing that the husband would
execute appropriate instruments, as required, to provide that
the wife and a designated bank would act as joint trustees to
administer the proceeds for the support of the wife and minor
children, the statute of limitations was not set in motion until
the date of the husband's death, and plaintiffs were not guilty
of neglect in failing to ascertain whether or not the policies
were in full force and effect prior to the time their cause
of action accrued.
[3] !d.-Proceeds-Persons Entitled-Effect of Divorce Decree.A divorced wife had no interest in the insurance policies of

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Insurance, § 361.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Insurance, § 220(4); [2] Insurance, §§ 2401 244.
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her husband at the date of his death where his obligation for
her support, under the terms of the divorce decree, terminated on her remarriage; and the interest of the children was
limited to the amount necessary for their support measured
by provisions of the divorce decree prior to reaching their
majority.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County. Aylett R. Cotton, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Action to recover the proceeds of insurance policies. Juugment for plaintiffs reversed with directions.
Raymond B. Haizlip and A. Brooks Berlin for Appellant.
Sullivan & West, Clyde S. West and James B. O'Grady for
Respondents.
CARTER J.-Defendant, Ida Cooper, appeals individually
and as executrix of the estate of Harold E. Cooper, from a
judgment in favor of Vera P. Alves, Harold E. Cooper and
Carolyn Joan Cooper, the former wife and minor children of
the decedent.
Vera and Harold Cooper were married in 1933. Two children, Harold, Jr. and Carolyn were born to them in 1935 and
1938, respectively. On May 21, 1948, in contemplation of a
legal separation, Vera and Harold entered into a property
settlement and separation agreement. By its terms Vera retained the family home and automobile and Harold certain
tools and shop equipment. It was agreed that Vera was to
have custody of the minor children and Harold was to pay
to Vera the sum of $100 per month for her support and the
sum of $90 per month support for the minor children. Each
party retained, under the agreement, the personal property in
his or her possession.
At the time this agreement was executed there were four
policies of insurance in force on the life of Harold. Three
policies, totaling a principal sum of $7,500, were issued by
the Northwestern Mutual Insurance Company; one policy, in
the principal sum of $7,500 (now worth $12,000), was issued
by the Equitable Life Assurance Society. Vera was the named
beneficiary in all of these policies.
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The agreement provided, with
to the policies of
insurance, as follows :1
"Eighth: The husband shall and does hereby release, trans-

fer, sell, assign and set over to the wife, all right, title and
interest t:n and to three certain life insurance policies written
in the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in the total principal sum of $7,500,
wherein the wife now appears as beneficiary and the husband
as insured; the httsband shall exectde appropriate instrument
as required by said insurance company and the American
Trust Company, to provide that the wife and said American

Trust Company shall act as joint trustees to administer the
proceeds of said life insurance policies for the support and
maintenance of the wife and said minor children, in the event
of husband's death.
''The husband shall pay all premiums on said policies as
they become due and shall maintain said policies in full
force and effect. Husband shall also pay when due all bills for
interest on indebtedness now outstanding against said policies,
and shall not take any further action which will increase
indebtedness against said policies or diminish the cash surrender value thereof. When the youngest of the said two

minor children shall have reached majority, the wife's rights

in and to said life insurance policies shall cease, and the
husband shall have the right to designate a new beneficiary or
cancel or otherwise dispose of said policies as he may desire.
"Ninth: The husband agrees to pay all premiums and to
keep in full force and effect until the younger of the two
minor children shall have reached majority, group life insurance in the present approximate principal amount of $7,500
written in the Equitable Life Assurance Society, 2 which the
husband now carries as an employee of the American Trust
Company and in which the wife is named as beneficiary. It is
understood and agreed that such group insurance is mandatory
so long as husband is employed by said American Trust Company, and that the principal amount and premiums vary from
time to time depending on loss experience of the insurance
company.
11
The husband shall execute appropriate instrument to
provide that the wife and said American Trust Company
shall act as joint trustees, to administer the proceeds of said

'The italicized portions are those under attack in the present pro~ing.

IIJ'hia policy provided that it was nontransferable.
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imntrance policy for the support and maintenance of the
wife and said minor children, in the event of husband's
death. When the younger of the said two minor children
shaU have reached majority, the wife's rights in and to said
policy shall cease, and the husband shall have the right to
designate a new beneficiary or cancel or otherwise dispose of
said policy as he may desire."
In February, 1949, V em obtained an interlocutory decree
of divorce which became final on March 6, 1950. Harold was
ordered to pay to Vera, for her support, the sum of $100
per month until her remarriage, and $100 per month for the
support of the two minor children. The interlocutory decree
recited that it appeared to the court that "the parties had
heretofore entered into an agreement of separation dated May
21, 1948, which said agreement has been fully consummated .
. . . " (Emphasis added.) The final decree of divorce made no
reference to the separation and property settlement agreement.
Subsequent to the divorce Harold paid $100 per month for
the support of the children rather than the $90 provided for
in the agreement.
After the divorce had become final, Vera married one
Alves, and Harold married the defendant, Ida. After his
remarriage Harold surrendered the three Northwestern Mutual policies for their cash value and changed the beneficiary
of the Equitable policy from Vera to Ida.
Subsequent to the execution of the agreement but prior to
the divorce action the parties negotiated through their common
attorney with respect to a trust instrument. One draft was
finally signed by Vera but it was never signed by Harold
or the American Trust Company.
Harold died on September 17, 1954. He left a will in which
Ida was named residuary legatee and executrix. One provision thereof declared "I intentionally omit to make provision
for my children, Harold E. Cooper, Jr., and Carolyn Joan
Cooper, as they are otherwise adequately provided for."
Shortly after Harold's death, Ida filed a claim with Equitable for the proceeds of the policy on Harold's life. Thereafter Vera and the two minor children brought suit against
Ida, individually, and as executrix, Northwestern Mutual and
Equitable. 3 The plaintiffs sought to recover the proceeds of
•Equitable deposited in court the sum of $12,000, and the suit against
it was dismissed. The suit against Northwestern was dismissed b7
stipulation.
... c.2d-l
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the policies mentioned in the agreement; or if they had been
paid to Ida to recover the proceeds from her; or if any of the
policies had been surrendered by Harold to recover the proceeds from Ida as executrix.
The trial court found that the agreement which had been
entered into between Vera and Harold had not been merged
in the decree of divorce or abandoned. It concluded that
plaintiffs were the equitable owners of the proceeds of all
four policies; that the sum of $12,000 paid into court be
paid to plaintiffs and that plaintiffs recover from the estate
of Harold the value of the three Northwestern policies surrendered by Harold, together with interest on both amounts
from the date of Harold's death.
The primary question here presented for determination is
whether the evidence supports the conclusion of the trial court
that the agreement survived the decree of divorce procured
by Vera.
In both paragraphs of the agreement relating to the insurance policies Harold was to execute "appropriate instrument[s)" to provide that the wife and American Trust
Company were to act as joint trustees to administer the
proceeds of the policies to provide for the support and
maintenance of both the wife and minor children in the event
of Harold's death. No such instrument was ever executed
although Vera did sign one proposed draft and testified that
she "took it for granted" that the trust instrument had been
signed by Harold and the American Trust Company.
The interlocutory decree of divorce which was prepared by
Vera's attorney contained this statement: "And it appearing
to the Court that the parties had heretofore entered into an
agreement of separation dated May 21, 1948, which said agreement has been fully consummated." (Emphasis added.) At
no time, of course, was the agreement fully consummated since
the contemplated trust agreement concerning the four insurance policies had never been executed. The above-quoted
statement constitutes the only reference in either decree to
the agreement. The decree differs from the agreement in two
respects: First, it awards to Vera the sum of $100 per month,
''until further order of the Court, or until the remarriage of
plaintiff [Vera]." (Emphasis added.) The agreement provided for the payment to her, by Harold, of the sum of $100
per month without any such provision for termination. Secondly, the agreement provided that Harold would pay $90
per month for the support of the two minor children until
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they reached majority "unless sooner married or deceased";
the decree provided that Harold would pay $100 per month
for the support and maintenance of the minor children "until
further order of the Court." The record shows that up until
the effective date of the decree, Harold paid $90 per month
for the support of the minor children; that thereafter he
paid $100 per month for their support. The record is completely silent as to whether he .paid Vera anything for her
own support after her remarriage.
The divorce obtained by Vera became final on March 6,
1950. Sometime thereafter (the date does not appear) Harold
was remarried to defendant. On October 3, 1951 (after his
remarriage), Harold surrendered the three Northwestern
policies for their cash value of $7,500. On or about November 17, 1950, he changed the beneficiary of the Equitable
policy from Vera to defendant, Ida, his then wife.
After Vera signed the draft of the proposed trust instrument (this was, apparently sometime in 1948), from all that
appears she made no effort to ascertain whether or not the
instrument was ever executed by Harold and the American
Trust Company.
Harold's will, executed on July 19, 1954, contained the
following statement: ''SIXTH: I intentionally omit to make
provisions for my children, HAROLD E. CooPER, JR., and
CAROLYN JoAN CooPER, as they are otherwise adequately provided for." So far as appears, other than the agreement and
the decree, no provision was made for the children.
[1] We are of the opinion that there is no evidence supporting the trial court's determination that the agreement had
not been abandoned or superseded by the decree of divorce
obtained by Vera. On the contrary, the record shows that
Vera procured a divorce and made no attempt to discover
whether a trust instrument had been executed by Harold;
that Harold made the payments for child support ordered by
the decree rather than those agreed upon in the agreement;
that Vera accepted those payments; that after the divorce
was granted Harold remarried and immediately surrendered
the Northwestern policies and changed the beneficiary of the
Equitable policy which was a clear indication that he considered the agreement no longer binding upon him; and that
in the interlocutory decree prepared by Vera's attorney it
was declared that the agreement had been "fully consummated."
Vera's argument that she and the children had a vested
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interest in the policies of insurance because of the terms
of the separation agreement must fail. The cases cited
in support of her argument are not in point. In Waxman v.
Citizens Nat. Trust & Sav. Bank, 123 Cal.App.2d 145, 149
[266 P.2d 48], by the terms of a property settlement agreement, the daughter was named as irrevocable beneficiary of a
policy of insurance. The property settlement agreement was
approved in the interlocutory decree of divorce. The parties
sought by written agreement, to modify the property settlement agreement as it affected the daughter. The court
held that the daughter had a vested equitable interest in the
life insurance policy which could not be defeated without her
consent. In the case at bar, the paragraphs of the agreement
relating to the insurance policies provided that trust instruments were to be executed with Vera and the Bank as cotrustees. There is no indication in the record that such instruments were ever executed by Harold and we cannot
speculate as to what the terms of such instruments would be.
In the Waxman case the property settlement agreement was
complete in itself and was, furthermore, approved by the
court in the divorce action. In Shoudy v. Shoudy, 55 Cal.
App. 344, 350 [203 P. 433], the parties had entered into an
agreement regarding certain policies of insurance which were
to be kept in full force and effect with plaintiff, decedent's
first wife, as beneficiary. The court held that plaintiff had
acquired fixed and vested "rights or equities" because of
the complete agreement entered into between the parties. In
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Franck, 9 Cal.App.2d 528, 531, 534
[50 P.2d 480], by the terms of a property settlement agreement, the wife was made the sole, irrevocable beneficiary
of certain policies of insurance. The court held that an insured could waive his right to change the beneficiary of a
life insurance policy and by contract convert a contingent
interest in the policy into a "vested equitable interest which
may not be subsequently defeated by an effort to change the
beneficiary without his consent." The agreement under
consideration here so far as the insurance policies were concerned was not self-executing inasmuch as it was specifically
provided that the policies were to become the subject matter
of a trust to be set up at some subsequent time. As we have
heretofore noted, Vera made no attempt to ascertain whether
the "appropriate instrument [s] " had ever been executed
and her conduct in procuring a decree of divorce in which it
was stated that the agreement had been fully consummated
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leads to the conclusion that the portions of the agreement
which had not been carried out had been abandoned by the
parties.
[2] There is no merit to defendant's arguments that plaintiffs must fail because of the statute of limitations or because
of laches. The statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 337,
subd.
is not set in motion until the date of the decedent's
death in a case such as this (Waxman v. Citizens Nat. Trust
& Sav. Bank, 123 Cal.App.2d 145, 149 [266 P.2d 48] ). Plaintiffs had no cause of action until Harold's death and were,
therefore, not guilty of neglect in failing to ascertain whether
or not the policies of insurance were in full force and effect
prior to the time their cause of action accrued.
[3] We have concluded that Vera had no interest in the
policies at the date of Harold's death, because Harold's
obligation for her support, under the terms of the divorce
decree, terminated upon her remarriage; and that the interest
of the children in the estate of their father is limited to the
amount necessary for their support measured by the provisions
of the divorce decree prior to reaching their majority.
The judgment is reversed with directions to the trial court
to enter judgment in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence,
and McComb J., concurred.
Respondents' petition for a rehearing was denied September
11, 1957.

